



Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Galanis, Spyros (2021) 'Group Testing and Social Distancing.', National Institute economic review. .





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
https://dro.dur.ac.uk




An often overlooked strategy for fighting the COVID-19 pandemic is group test-
ing. Its main advantage is that it can scale, enabling the regular testing of the whole
population. We argue that another advantage is that it can induce social distancing.
Using a simple model, we show that if a group tests positive and its members are in
close social proximity, then they will rationally choose not to meet. The driving force
is the uncertainty about who has the virus and the fact that the group cares about its
collective welfare. We therefore propose identifying socially connected groups, such as
colleagues, friends and neighbours, and testing them regularly.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, D83, I12.
Keywords: COVID-19, social proximity, health, infections, social distancing.
1 Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes the COVID-19 disease, has been spreading rapidly and
globally since December 2019, resulting in alarmingly high fatality rates, national lockdowns
and unprecedented projected economic damage (Gopinath (2020)). The main strategies
for addressing the pandemic have been individual tests, vaccinations and contact tracing.
However, none of these measures has proved to be wholly effective. Countries have not
managed to scale individual testing, contact tracing only works when the cases are very low,
and it may take years before the majority of the world population is inoculated.
An alternative strategy, that has been proposed by several papers, is group testing
(Aldridge et al. (2019)). A group of people is tested using a single test. If the test is
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negative, then no one has the virus, whereas if it is positive, then at least one person is
infected, even though their identity is not revealed. Because the samples of all individuals
are mixed together, the test is anonymised, so it is impossible to know who has the virus.
The main advantage of group testing is its scalability, as it enables the testing of a big part
of the population, on a regular basis.
In this paper we argue that, as long as groups are selected carefully, another advantage of
group testing is that it can induce social distancing. In particular, we show that if members
of a group do not want to meet when all the information they have is that at least one of
them is infectious, then they would still not want to meet, even if each had some private
information about who is infected or not. This is important because, irrespective of what
members of the group know about who is infectious, the public announcement of a positive
group test will induce everyone not to meet. However, this does not apply to all groups,
only to those that are in social proximity. We say that a group is in social proximity if its
members do not want to meet when at least one of them is infectious, because their total
welfare will decrease. Our results therefore show that announcing a positive test to a group
in social proximity will induce members not to meet.
To provide a simple example, suppose that a group consists of Alex and Bob. If they
decide not to meet, then we normalise the utility that each gets to zero. If Alex is susceptible
to infection while Bob is infected, then meeting implies that Bob might be infected. Will
their total utility be above 0? If it is, then it means that the cost to Alex from possibly being
infected is less than the benefit to Bob from meeting. This could happen because Bob does
not care about Alex’s welfare. Or, it could be because Bob and Alex are complete strangers,
so “meeting” just means that they pass by each other on the street, two metres apart, which
means that Alex will probably not be infected. In that case, meeting just means that they
are allowed to walk on the street, which gives both a positive utility. In that case, we say
that the group is not in social proximity.
On the other hand, if meeting implies that the sum of their utilities is negative, we say
that the group is in social proximity. This could be because Bob incurs an extra cost if
Alex becomes infected. Or, it could be that“meeting” means that they access the gym at
the same time, so the probability that Alex is infected is big and therefore his cost is higher
than the benefit of Bob from exercising.
Social proximity is not true for groups consisting of people who are complete strangers,
because they do not care about each other’s welfare, they meet rarely, or in a socially
distanced way. For example, a randomly selected group of people in a big city is not in
social proximity, either because they do not care about each other’s welfare, or because
meeting only takes place in a socially distanced way, if at all. This means that the sum of
their utilities if they meet is greater than if they do not meet, even if someone is infected.
However, the parents of students in a school could be in social proximity, as they meet
regularly, either directly or through their kids. The same can be true of employees who work
on the same floor of a building. As the group increases in size, social proximity reduces. For
example, if the group is the whole country, the total benefit from meeting with each other
will surely be greater than the cost that at least one person gets infected. On the other
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hand, it is important to note that social proximity is different from altruism. Members can
be in social proximity without necessarily caring about the condition of other members.
We use the static version of the standard SIR epidemiology model to explain the mech-
anism (Kermack and McKendrick (1927), Anderson and May (1992)). Agents can have one
of three conditions. They can be infected (I), which means that they can infect others if
they meet them. They can be susceptible (S) to infection, so that they will contract the
virus if they meet someone who is infected. Or, they can be recovered (R), which means
that they do not transmit the virus and cannot get infected. We extend the SIR model by
assuming that agents face uncertainty about what is their condition, and the condition of
others. This is relevant in the current COVID-19 pandemic, as several people are asymp-
tomatic after contracting the virus, so they may not know that they are infected (Mizumoto
et al. (2020)). Agents have a common prior and receive private information about everyone’s
condition. Each agent has two available actions: to meet within the group, or not to meet.
Their utility depends on their condition, their action and the actions of everyone else. They
rationally choose the action that maximises their expected utility, given their updated beliefs
and actions of others. We examine whether the group will decide to meet in two settings: a
non-strategic and a strategic one.1
When a group test turns out positive, it is publicly announced to the group. We then say
that the group is in danger, because at least one member is infected, so if they meet then it
is likely that at least one member is going to be infected. A group test is anonymised and
there is no way of knowing who is infected. Although the identity of the infected agent is
not revealed, it becomes common knowledge that if the group meets, then the group will be
in danger. Do agents care about this possibility? If they do, we say that they are in close
social proximity.
In a non-strategic setting, social proximity specifies that the agents’ total welfare is
greater if they do not meet, given that the group is in danger, as compared to if they meet.
In a strategic setting, social proximity specifies that it is ex ante Pareto optimal not to
meet, given that the group is in danger. The ex ante stage is before receiving their private
information, but after they are notified that the group is in danger. We formalise this
condition by assuming that there is no strategy profile that ex ante Pareto dominates the
strategy profile where no-one meets.
Will agents decide to meet? In a non-strategic setting, we show that it cannot be common
knowledge that they decide to meet (Theorem 1). In a strategic setting, we show that not
meeting is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Theorem 2).
To gain some intuition, consider first the following “dynamic” story. Suppose that after
a positive group test, a member of the group expresses eagerness to meet. Then, all others
deduce that she must consider it very likely that she is not in danger, either because she
currently has the virus, or because she had it in the past and is now immune. Since at
least one member must have the virus, everyone else updates upwards the probability that
1We also note that our model is more general than the SIR model, in the sense that we formulate our
results in terms of states of the world, which could describe fewer (e.g. just S and I) or more conditions for
each agent.
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they themselves are in danger, so this makes them even less willing to meet. If, given this
updating, others are still willing to meet, the remaining members become even more cautious.
Social proximity implies that not everyone can be better off from meeting, given that the
group is in danger, hence as the updating of beliefs continues, eventually some members
decide not to meet.
We now provide a rough sketch of the proofs of the two results. Consider first the
non-strategic environment and normalise the utility of any agent from not meeting to be 0.
An agent chooses to meet if, according to her private information and updated beliefs, her
expected utility from doing so is strictly positive. A public announcement that meeting is
dangerous for the group implies that it becomes common knowledge that at least one agent
would be infected if they met. Even though agents may not know who the newly infected
member might be, social proximity implies that it is common knowledge that the sum of
their utilities will always be weakly negative. Can it be common knowledge that they decide
to meet? If that is the case, then it is also common knowledge that everyone’s expected
utility, according to their own private information, is strictly positive. But now there is
an incompatibility, because while it is common knowledge that everyone always has strictly
positive expected utility, it is also common knowledge that the sum of the utilities for all
agents is always weakly negative. As both statements cannot be true simultaneously, the
group does not meet.
In a strategic setting, suppose that there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where some
agents decide to meet, even though it is common knowledge that the group is in danger.
Take any agent and consider her individual decision problem, given that everyone else’s
actions are fixed. If her strategy is never to meet, she can guarantee an ex ante expected
utility of 0. Since at each state she receives some private information and not meeting is
always an option, her equilibrium strategy cannot result in her getting an ex ante expected
utility lower than 0, otherwise the value of information would be negative. Hence, her ex
ante expected utility from her equilibrium strategy cannot be lower than 0. As this is true
for all agents, ex ante Pareto optimality of not meeting, due to social proximity, implies that
the equilibrium strategy is that no-one meets.
The value of information result states that in a single-agent decision problem, an agent
will always be better off ex ante, if in the interim stage she receives more information. Hence,
the value of information is positive. The intuition is that because actions are conditioned on
information, more information means that she can adjust better her actions, depending on
what the true state is, so that in expectation her utility increases. This result requires that
agents are sophisticated, so that their information structure forms a partition of the state
space. See Geanakoplos (1989) and Galanis (2015, 2016, 2018), among others, who show
that the value of information may be negative when agents are boundedly rational.
1.1 Related literature
There is a growing literature on the economics of pandemics, incorporating individual de-
cision making and notions of equilibrium. Toxvaerd (2019, 2020) extends the SIS and SIR
models, by introducing endogenous social distancing. Makris (2020) allows for fatalities and
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risk heterogeneity, calibrating the model to UK data in order to examine various government
interventions. Eichenbaum et al. (2020) develop an SIR-macro model to study containment
policies, whereas Alvarez et al. (2020) examine the optimal lockdown policy.
These models are dynamic and aim to trace the spreading of the virus and the economic
consequences. Our model is static and only concerns a single decision of whether to meet
within a group. Moreover, an aspect that is missing from these models, that we add here,
is that agents do not know what their condition is when making a decision about who to
meet. This is especially relevant in the current COVID-19 pandemic, as it seems that several
people are asymptomatic for several days after contracting the virus, so they do not know
that they are infected. Moreover, our emphasis is more local, as we identify conditions on
groups which imply that the members will not meet.
Several papers (e.g. Salathé et al. (2010), Yoneki and Crowcroft (2014) and Ferretti et al.
(2020)) study digital contact tracing, examining whether information about geographical
proximity between infected and susceptible can be used, in order to decrease the spread of a
virus. However, these papers do not take into account the behavioural aspect of transmission
and do not try to predict how individuals will behave. The current paper incorporates the
behavioural aspects of choosing to meet and argues in favour of leveraging social proximity,
as an added tool in fighting pandemics.
Group testing is not a new idea and goes back to Dorfman (1943). It has been used to
detect syphilis, hepatitis B and HIV, among others. See Aldridge et al. (2019) for a survey.
Group testing can also be performed in the case of Covid-19.2 Gollier and Gossner (2020)
show how group testing can be optimised to multiply the efficiency of tests against Covid-19,
using three applications.
Our results are closely related to the no trade theorems, first discussed by Aumann (1976)
and Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Aumann (1976) showed that “we cannot agree to disagree”,
whereas we show that “if we agree that the group is in danger, we cannot agree to meet”.
Our result that the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that the group does not meet,
is closely related to a no trade result of Geanakoplos (1989). Several papers examine the
question of whether to initiate contact between two individuals when one might be infected
(Matthies and Toxvaerd (2016), Toxvaerd (2019, 2021)). However, to our knowledge, the
current paper is the first that uses the “agreeing to disagree” type of results in the economics
of epidemiology.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, formalising the notion
of social proximity. Section 3 presents the two results, that it cannot be common knowledge
that the group meets and that the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that they do not
meet. Section 4 concludes and discusses the policy implications. The proofs and the technical
details are contained in the Appendix.
2Technion – Israel Institute of Technology have shown they can test more than




Let H be a finite set of n humans, or agents. An agent can have one of three conditions: be
susceptible (S), infected (I) or recovered (R). Agents are uncertain about their condition and
the condition of others. Their uncertainty is summarised by state space Ω. A state of the
world ω ∈ Ω specifies the condition of each agent (S, I or R).3 Although agents are uncertain
about the true state, they have some private information. Agent i’s private information
is represented by a partition Πi of the state space Ω. If ω ∈ Ω is the true state, agent
i is informed that some state in Πi(ω) ⊆ Ω is true. Agents share a common probability
distribution p over Ω, so that the ex ante probability of state ω is p(ω) > 0.
To provide an example, suppose there are two agents. A state ω describes the condition of
both individuals, so state SI specifies that agent 1 is susceptible and agent 2 is infected. The
state space Ω is {SS, SR, SI,RS,RR,RI, IS, IR, II}. Suppose that agent 1 always knows
her own condition, because she does individual tests, but she has no information about the
condition of agent 2. Her partition Π1 is {{(SS, SR, SI}, {RS,RR,RI}, {IS, IR, II}}, with
three partition elements. Suppose that agent 2 only knows whether she is infected or not, be-
cause of the symptoms she develops. Her partition Π2 is {{(SI,RI, II}, {SS, SR,RS,RR, IS, IR}}.
Each agent i has two choices, C = {0, 1}: either to meet with the people in the group, 1, or
not, 0. Let fi : Πi → C be the strategy of agent i, mapping each of her partition elements to
an action in C. Let f = (f1, . . . , fH) be a profile of strategies and f(ω) = (f1(ω), . . . , fH(ω))
be the particular realisation of actions at state ω.
Agent i’s utility depends on the actions and the condition (S, I or R) of everyone in the
group. For example, ui(ω, f(ω)) is i’s utility when the true state is ω and the actions of
everyone is given by the strategy profile f(ω). Our first assumption normalises i’s utility to
be 0 from not meeting with the group, irrespective of what everyone else is doing.
Assumption 1. For all agents i ∈ H, states ω ∈ Ω and strategy profiles f with fi(ω) = 0,
ui(ω, f(ω)) = 0.
2.1 Social proximity
We now formalise the notion of social proximity. Agent i’s utility from meeting with the
group depends on the condition (S, I, R) and the action of each member of the group. What
does it mean that she cares about other members of the group? To provide some intuition,
consider first the simple case where the group consists of two agents, i and j. If both decide
to meet, agent i will get a positive payoff mij. However, if i is susceptible (S) and j is infected
(I), agent i will incur a cost from contracting the virus, so her total utility will be less than
if they did not meet. From the normalisation of Assumption 1, her utility will be negative.
If i is infected and j is susceptible, then j will incur a cost from contracting the virus and
have a negative utility. In states (SS, SR, RR, RS, RI, IR), the virus is not transmitted and
both agents have positive utility. We argue that II should be in D at the end of this section.
3In general, we do not explicitly use the three conditions in any of the results, as we state them only in
terms of states of the world.
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Let D = {SI, IS, II} ⊆ Ω be the event that “the group is in danger”, because at
least one member of the group will contract the virus by meeting. If the group con-
sists of more than 2 agents, D is the set of all states ω such that at least one i is sus-
ceptible and at least one j is infected. For example, if there are three agents, D =
{SIS, SII, SIR, ISS, ISI, ISR, IIS,RIS, SSI,RSI, III}. Recall that a group test is anonymised,
so it is impossible to know who in particular is infected.
Let 1 be the strategy profile specifying that all agents decide to meet always, whereas
0 is the strategy profile where all agents decide never to meet. The following assumption
specifies that for each state in D, which describes that the group is in danger, the total
welfare of the group is higher if they all decide not to meet, as compared to deciding to
meet.
Assumption 2. For all states ω ∈ D,
∑
i∈H




To understand this assumption, suppose first that the group consists of two agents, i, j,
and D = {IS, SI, II}. At state ω = IS, agent j is susceptible and therefore her utility from
meeting within this group is negative, uj(IS,1) = −k < 0, because she may contract the
virus. What about i’s utility at ω = IS? It is reasonable to assume that if the two agents
are friends or care about each other, i’s utility, ui(IS,1) = l, cannot be greater than k. In
other words, if i knew with certainty that the state is IS and therefore she would surely
infect j, her benefit l would not outweigh the cost k incurred by j, so that −k + l ≤ 0 and
the total welfare of the group is weakly negative.
Should state II,“everyone is infected”, be included in D? If everyone is infected, is the
group in danger? One could argue that it is not, because people cannot get more infected.
On the other hand, it could be that there are different strains of the virus, or a member
may have a high virus load that could be passed to another with a low load, so it could still
be dangerous to meet. Health authorities around the world do not allow infected people to
freely meet, so the latter arguments are probably more prevalent. Our results do not depend
on whether II belongs to D, as Theorems 1 and 2 are stated in terms of an abstract set
D. However, this matters for the interpretation of our model, because we consider that the
announcement of a positive test makes it common knowledge that the group is in danger.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that II belongs to D, or that II is impossible.
Finally, it may seem strange that within a group of strangers, where there is no social
proximity, Assumption 2 implies that the total welfare increases from meeting, whereas for
people that are in social proximity, the welfare decreases. There are two reasons for that.
First, members of groups in social proximity may care about each other, which means that
they will incur a cost if another member gets infected when they meet. Second, they meet in
places where the danger of transmission is high, for example because they work in the same
building or their kids meet in the school, which means that they increase the probability that
they become infected. On the other hand, strangers may not care about each or they meet




Suppose that it is announced that the test is positive, so it becomes common knowledge that
the group is in danger, because at least one member might get infected if they meet. What
will they do? We examine this question in two settings. In a non-strategic setting, we show
that it cannot be common knowledge that they meet. In a strategic setting, not meeting is
the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
3.1 We cannot agree to meet
Let M be the event describing that everyone in the group decides to meet. A state ω belongs
to M if each agent i’s expected utility is strictly positive, given that everyone else also decides
to meet.4 Because the utility from not meeting is 0, a strictly positive expected utility implies
that the individual would like to meet. If the group decides to meet at ω ∈M , this becomes
common knowledge. That is, we assume that members do not meet privately with each
other, but everyone meets with everyone else and this is common knowledge. Formally, we
say that the group agrees to meet at state ω ∈ Ω if M is common knowledge at ω.5 This
implies that if only a few members meet, we do not consider that the group has met.
This definition can also be interpreted as another aspect of social proximity. If the group
is very large and members do not know each other, or they do not have a common place
where they meet, it becomes more difficult to monitor what everyone is doing, hence even if
they meet, this does not become common knowledge, so they cannot agree to meet.
Suppose that the group test turns out positive and this is announced within the group.
This means that the event D, “the group is in danger”, becomes common knowledge. More
generally, in all states in D, the group test turns out positive and event D is common
knowledge. Will the members of the group decide to meet? As the following Theorem
shows, the answer is no.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if at all states in D it is common knowledge that
the group is in danger, the group cannot agree to meet at any state in D.
3.2 The unique equilibrium is not to meet
We now examine the same question in a strategic setting. Suppose that after the group is
publicly notified that they are in danger, so D is common knowledge, they play the following
standard Bayesian game. A state ω ∈ D occurs, each agent receives her private information,
updates her beliefs and plays a best response. Could it be that meeting is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium? We show that the unique equilibrium is that they do not meet.
Social proximity, defined as the property that members care about their collective welfare,
is expressed in this game by specifying that it is ex ante Pareto optimal not to meet, when
the group is in danger. The ex ante refers to the stage where the agents have not yet received
4Recall from Assumption 1 that utility from not meeting is 0, irrespective of what everyone else is doing.
5See the Appendix on how we define common knowledge.
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their private information, but they are informed that the group is in danger, so that it is
common knowledge that one state in D is true. In other words, there is a veil of ignorance
about who might be infected if the group meets.
Recall that a strategy fi of agent i maps each partition cell to one of two actions: meet





p(ω)ui(ω, f(ω)) ≥ 0, then agent i can do weakly better with f ,
than if she decides not to meet at all states ω ∈ D.6 Ex ante Pareto optimality implies that
although this could be true for some agents, it cannot be true for all, because then it would
be collectively better for the group to meet, even though they are in danger. Equivalently, ex
ante Pareto optimality implies that if everyone’s ex ante expected utility (given D) is weakly
greater than 0, then it is exactly zero and everyone chooses not to meet.7 We formalise this




p(ω)ui(ω, f(ω)) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ H, then fi(ω) = 0 for all i ∈ H and
all ω ∈ D.
The following Theorem shows that if it is common knowledge that the group is in danger,
then the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not to meet.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, if at all states in D it is common knowledge that
the group is in danger, then the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not to meet.
4 Discussion and policy implications
Our results show that group testing can leverage social proximity and incentives, in order to
induce social distancing. If a group cares about their collective welfare, they will rationally
choose not to meet, as soon as they learn that some members are in danger of contracting
the virus. This is true both in a strategic and a non-strategic setting. If we also consider that
group testing can scale considerably faster than individual testing, it is evident that it can
act as a complementary strategy for addressing the pandemic, alongside the existing ones,
such as individual testing, contract tracing, lockdowns and inoculations. This is especially
relevant for countries which cannot inoculate a big part of their population fast enough.
The policy implications are straightforward. As a first, step, we propose identifying
groups of people that are socially and geographically connected, such as students within
a school, colleagues and co-workers within a workplace, or neighbours, and testing them
regularly. The geographical proximity of the members of the group makes regular testing
easier to implement. More importantly, geographical proximity can induce social proximity,
as it forces the group to care more about its total welfare, because meeting when at least
one member is infected may impact everyone.
6Recall, from Assumption 1, that she gets 0 if she does not meet, irrespective of what the others are
doing.
7We are implicitly assuming that there is no profile of strategies, other than 0, that gives a utility of 0 to
everyone.
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On the other hand, group testing has some limitations. Although it can induce social
distancing within a group, it may not be as effective in limiting contact across different
groups. For example, although a worker may choose not to meet his colleagues if a positive
group test is announced in the workplace, he may still be willing to play football with his
friends, as this group is not tested or has tested negative. This creates a trade-off, between
the scalability of group testing and its possibly reduced effectiveness across groups, which
would be an interesting direction for future research. It also raises the question of what is
the optimal way of choosing which further groups to test, based on the currently positive
tests and the membership of people across groups.
We conclude by making some comments on the interpretation of the model. First, al-
though the SIR model is a good starting point for thinking about how the condition of agent
i might impact agent j if they meet, we do not use the three conditions explicitly in our
model. Instead, we formalise our assumptions and results within an abstract state space, so
we can accommodate fewer or more conditions. Second, we do not take a stance on whether
a susceptible to infection individual will surely get infected if the group meets. What matters
for our results is how their utility will decrease, if they meet when the group is in danger.
Second, the model does not preclude that some members develop symptoms. When
some members have symptoms, they may know that they are infected and maybe some
other members know that too. This would mean that the group is in danger, even without a
positive test. In general, any private information is allowed, so members can know something
about the condition of others or of themselves. However, since the model is static, it cannot
describe a dynamic process where some members become symptomatic and then they get
quarantined. In such an extension, the quarantined members would be removed from the
group for some periods. If there is correlation between someone developing symptoms and
another one becoming infected (for example a spouse), then the quarantine could provide
public information about the condition of members that are not currently quarantined.
Finally, we discuss our implicit assumption that the announcement of a positive group
test implies that D becomes common knowledge. If we consider all possible combinations of
the SIR conditions for all agents, then there are two cases where a positive group test does
not necessarily imply that someone will get infected. The first is that everyone is infected. As
we argue in Section 2.1, different agents may have different variants of the virus, or different
virus loads, so meeting can still be dangerous. The second is that one member is infected but
everyone else is recovered, hence they are immune to being infected. We implicitly assume
that this is not possible. One could justify this assumption by saying that even if everyone
else is vaccinated, there is still the possibility that someone will be infected, so that the
probability that everyone is immune is zero. Alternatively, we could say that if everyone else





The state space Ω is a subset of the Cartesian product {S, I, R}H . At state ω ∈ Ω,




ω′ if ω′ ∈ Πi(ω) and 0 otherwise. Let ui : Ω × CH → R be i’s utility, a function of the
state and everyone’s action. At state ω and given a profile of strategies f , agent i updates
her beliefs using her private information Πi(ω) and decides to meet with the group if her














′) is the profile
of actions at ω′, for all agents except i.
Let the profile of actions where no-one meets at any state to be 0, so that 0i(ω) = 0 for
all i ∈ H and ω ∈ Ω. The profile of strategies where everyone meets always is denoted 1,
so that 1i(ω) = 1 for all i ∈ H and ω ∈ Ω. To simplify the notation, we write i’s utility as
ui(ω,1), instead of ui(ω,1(ω)).
An event E is a subset of Ω. For example, the event “agent j meets with the group”
is the set of states ω′ such that fj(ω
′) = 1. Agent i knows event E at ω if Πi(ω) ⊆ E.
This means that in all states that she considers possible at ω, E is true. Let M be the
event describing that everyone in the group decides to meet. A state ω belongs to M if each
agent i’s expected utility is strictly positive, given that everyone else also decides to meet.






′,1) > 0, for all i ∈ H. The
event “agent j knows that everyone meets within the group” consists of all states ω such
that Πj(ω) ⊆M .
In order to define higher orders of reasoning about the knowledge of others, let Πi(F ) =⋃
ω′∈F
Πi(ω
′) be the set of all states that i might think are possible, if the true state is in F .
Using this notation, we can say that Πj(Πi(ω)) is the set of states that, at ω, agent i thinks
that j considers possible. If Πj(Πi(ω)) ⊆ F , then we say that i knows that j knows F . An
event E is common knowledge at ω if Πin(Πin−1 . . . (Πi1(ω))) ⊆ E, for any sequence of agents
i1, . . . , in.
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We restrict the definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to states in D, because D is
common knowledge after the public announcement of the positive test. A profile of strategies
f is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for all states ω ∈ D, fi is a best response for agent i.















for all c ∈ {0, 1}.9
8These notions are explained clearly in Geanakoplos (1992).
9Recall that a strategy fi maps elements of Πi to C, hence fi(ω
′) = fi(ω
′′) for all ω′, ω′′ ∈ Πi(ω).
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that at all states in D it is common knowledge that the group
is in danger, but the group decides to meet at ω ∈ D. By definition, event M is common
knowledge at ω.
Let M(ω) be the set of states that are reachable from ω. Formally, M(ω) is the union
of sets Πin(Πin−1 . . . (Πi1(ω))), for any sequence of agents i1, . . . , in. Say that an event is self-
evident (within the group) if whenever it occurs, everyone knows it. Formally, if ω′ ∈ E ′,
then Πi(ω
′) ⊆ E ′ for all i ∈ H. Then, M(ω) can be described as the smallest self-evident
event that contains ω.10 Aumann (1976) shows that an event E is common knowledge at ω
if and only if M(ω) ⊆ E.
We therefore have that M(ω) ⊆ M
⋂







′′,1) > 0. Because M(ω) is an element of the finest com-
mon coarsening of the partitions of all agents within the group, we have that for each
i ∈ H, M(ω) is partitioned by some elements of i’s partition Πi. By noting that for ev-


















′,1) > 0. This implies that for some state ω′ ∈ M(ω), we have that∑
i∈H
ui(ω,1) > 0. But this contradicts Assumption 2 and the fact that M(ω) ⊆ D. Hence,
the group cannot agree to meet at any ω ∈ D.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 of Geanakoplos (1989). Sup-
pose that at all states in D it is common knowledge that the group is in danger, so one state
ω ∈ D is true. Let (f1, . . . , fH) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Fix fj for all j 6= i and look
at the one-agent decision problem for agent i. By choosing 0 at all states in D, all types
of i can guarantee a payoff of 0, from Assumption 1, irrespective of what other players are







′, f(ω′)) ≥ 0. Adding over all partition elements of D, we have∑
ω′∈D
p(ω′)ui(ω
′, f(ω′)) ≥ 0. Because this is true for all agents, Assumption 3 implies that
fi(ω) = 0 for all i ∈ H and all ω ∈ D, hence no-one chooses to meet.
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